Why Love, Care and Solidarity are Political Matters:
Affective equality and Fraser’s model of social justice

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The relational realities of nurturing constitute a discrete site of social practice within and through which inequalities are created. The affective worlds of love, care and solidarity are therefore sites of political import that need to be examined in their own right while recognizing their inter-relatedness with economic, political and cultural systems (Baker, Lynch, Cantillon and Walsh 2009). Drawing on extensive sociological research undertaken on care work, paid work and on education in a range of different studies (Lynch, Baker and Lyons 2009; Lynch, Grummell and Devine, 2012), this paper argues that Fraser’s (2008) three-dimensional framework for analyzing injustice needs to be expanded to include a fourth, relational dimension.

The affective relations within which loving, caring and solidarity are grounded constitute discrete fields of social action. Social justice issues are not confined to questions of redistribution, recognition or representation therefore; they also involve discrete sites of relational practice that impact on parity of participation, a principle which Fraser (2003) identifies as key to determining what is socially just.
Introduction

This paper highlights the importance of affective equality for producing an egalitarian global order. It begins by acknowledging the historical realities of political egalitarian thinking and its deep ontological indifference to human relatiionality, dependency and interdependency. It then examines the contribution of Nancy Fraser’s three-dimensional theory of justice to egalitarian thinking, highlighting its many merits but also its limitations in neglecting the sociological realities of the affective domains of social life. It outlines a four-dimensional framework for egalitarian thinking, one that takes account of affective relations and highlights their inter-relationship with redistributive, recognition and representational systems. The paper then explores the implications of relationality and comments on the links between affective relations, ethics and politics. The paper concludes with some comments on why social scientific thought needs to take greater account of the affective/normative interface in social life.

Egalitarian Theory and Care

Most branches of political egalitarian thinking remain concerned with the more ‘public’ spheres of life, namely the political relations of the state, the economic relations of the market, and the cultural relations governing social recognition. Inequalities of income and wealth, status and power have dominated egalitarian
theory. Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice*, which has been the dominant work in Anglophone political theory since its publication in 1971, is a clear example of a text that gives primacy to the public sphere.

From the time of Hobbes and Locke to that of Rousseau and Kant and, up to and including Rawls, Western political theorists have also glorified the autonomous concept of the citizen. They have upheld a separatist view of the person, ignoring the reality of human dependency and interdependency across the life course (Benhabib, 1992). Moreover, they have idealized autonomy and independence as a sign of maturity and growth, placing a premium on a human condition that is never fully realizable (England, 2005). In so far as it ignores relationality, liberal political thinking has glorified a concept of the person that is separated rather than connected. It is quite indifferent to the socio-political reality that “no one escapes dependency in a lifetime and many must care for dependents in the course of a life” (Kittay 1999: xiii).

Like most of the social sciences' political theory has also been driven by a Cartesian rationality. There is a denial of the importance of emotions and affective realities in politics which creates significant omissions in political understanding, not only as to how gender inequalities operate across society, but also in terms of what subjects are deemed suitable for sociopolitical analysis.

*The Feminist Contribution*

While there has been an intense debate about care and its implications for gender
justice, this has taken place largely outside the domain of mainstream egalitarian
time, mostly among feminist economists and sociologists (Folbre 1994, 200;
Meyers 2003). Feminist legal theorists (Fineman 2004, Fineman and Dougherty
2005) have also drawn attention to care as a site of injustice. Within political
time, feminist-inspired work has played the key role in taking issues of care,
love and solidarity out of the privatised world of the family (Benhabib 1992;
attention to the salience of care and love as goods of public significance (Kittay
1999), and have identified the importance of caring as a human capability meeting
a basic human need (Nussbaum 1995, 2001). They have also exposed the
limitations of conceptualisations of citizenship devoid of a concept of care, and
highlighted the importance of caring as work, work that needs to be rewarded and
distributed equally between women and men in particular (Finch and Groves
1983; Fraser and Gordon 1997; Held, 1995; Hochschild 1989; Sevenhuijsen
1998).

Overall, what feminist scholars have helped to do is to shift intellectual thought
from its intellectual fixation with the Weberian and Marxist structuralist trilogy of
social class, status and power as the primary categories for investigating the
generation of inequalities and exploitations. They have drawn attention to the way
the care world and affective domains of life are discrete spheres of social action,
albeit deeply interwoven with the economic, political and cultural spheres.
Fraser’s three dimensional framework

In her later work (2005, 2008, 2010) Nancy Fraser has endorsed a three dimensional theory of social justice based on principles of redistribution, recognition and representation (Nash and Bell, 2007). She has recognised the limitations of her earlier two-dimensional framework because it neglected political relations as a discrete site for generating injustice. In particular, she has highlighted the importance of overcoming the Keynesian-Westphalian framework in order to address global “meta-political injustices” that “arise when the division of political space into bounded polities works to misframe first order questions of distribution, recognition and representation – say, by casting what are actually transnational injustices as national matters” (Fraser 2008: 6). Grounded in her view that equality and social justice are principally problems of parity of participation (Fraser 2003), she claims that the key issue for promoting justice is that it permits all members of the global community to interact with one another as peers. For participatory parity to be upheld, she outlines at least three conditions that must be met. These are grounded sociologically in having equality in economic, political and cultural relations:

First, the distribution of material resources must be such as to ensure participants’ independence and ‘voice’. This condition precludes economic structures that institutionalize deprivation, exploitation, and gross disparities in wealth, income, labor and leisure time, which prevent some people from participating as full partners in social interaction. Second, the social status order must express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for achieving social esteem. This condition precludes institutionalized patterns of cultural value that
systematically depreciate some categories of people and the qualities associated with them, thus denying them the status of full partners in social interaction.

Finally, the political constitution of society must be such as to accord roughly equal political voice to all social actors. This condition rules out electoral decision rules and media structures that systematically deprive some people of their fair chance to influence decisions that affect them. All three conditions are necessary for participatory parity. None alone is sufficient.

(Fraser 2010: 365)

While Fraser’s work is a sophisticated theoretical framework for mapping problem of equality and social justice, it does not analyse the affective domain of life as a discrete site of social practice. It does not address the ways in which the affective relations of the care world operate both independently of, and intersectionally with, economic, political and cultural relations in promoting injustice. Because humans are emotional beings who live for a considerable portion of life in states of dependency, especially in early and later years, the great majority develop affective ties and related care obligations that impact deeply on their well being (Kittay 1999). In the doing of care work, these affective relations are also highly gendered, and often deeply unjust to women (Bubeck 1995; Jónasdóttir 1994). The “misframing” of injustice within egalitarian theory does not arise only therefore “when the state-territorial frame is imposed on transnational sources of injustice” (Fraser 2008: 114), it also arises when affective inequalities in the doing and receiving of love, care and solidarity are not framed as core problems for egalitarian theory in the first instance.
As Kittay (1999) and other feminists (Fineman 2004; Folbre 1994 and Gilligan 1995) have observed, the issue is not to choose between equality and care but to develop a ‘connection-based’ conception of equality and justice that recognises that dependency is a typical condition of human life, that dependents need care, and that dependency workers – those who provide this care – need support in doing so.

The 4th Dimension of Injustice: Affective Inequality and Relationality

Matters of love, care and solidarity (affective relations – see Baker, Lynch et al. 2009) are deeply implicated in the generation of injustice not only in the obvious ways in the family sphere (Finch and Groves 1983; Folbre 1994) but also in terms of how care is organized globally (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003), how much of the economy, polity and cultural spheres of social life ‘free-ride’ on unpaid and poorly paid care, love and solidarity work (Fineman, 2004, 2008) and in how lack of solidarity at nation state levels produces deeply inegalitarian health outcomes within and between states (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009).

The salience of the affective system arises as a site for generating injustice arises from the fact that all people have urgent needs for care at various stages in their lives, as a consequence of infancy, illness, impairment or other vulnerabilities (Fineman 2008). Being cared for is also a fundamental prerequisite for human development (Kittay 1999; Nussbaum 2001). And, as relations of love, care and solidarity help to establish a basic sense of importance, value and belonging, a sense of being appreciated, wanted and cared about (Lynch et al. 2009), being deprived of love and care is experienced as a serious loss and deprivation (Feeley
Defining Affective Equality and Inequality

Affective equality is about both securing equality in the distribution of the nurturing provided through love, care and solidarity relationships and securing equality in the doing of emotional and other work involved in creating love, care and solidarity relations. Affective inequality occurs directly when people are deprived of the love, care and solidarity (LCS) they need to survive and develop as human beings (including the supports they need as carers) and/or when they are abused, violated or neglected affectively. It also occurs when the burdens and pleasures of care and love work are unequally distributed in society, between women and men particularly, but also between classes, ethnic/racial groups and across nation state boundaries. Affective inequality occurs indirectly when people are not recognised economically, politically and/or culturally (e.g. through education) for their love and care work and when love, care and solidarity work is trivialised by omission from public discourse.

The concept of affective equality is based on a number of key premises. First, it assumes that humans live in profound states of dependency and interdependency and are therefore relational beings. Second, it assumes that people are deeply vulnerable at several levels, corporeally, emotionally, socially, politically, culturally and economically. Third, it assumes that people are sentient beings,
with relational identities and feelings (both positive and negative) and that these feelings and identities play an important role in informing normative rationality; relational feelings influence choices about what is good and bad, moral and immoral. Finally, it assumes the citizen is a carer and care recipient both in the public and the private domain of life so lay normativity is not the prerogative of the private sphere

As noted above, there are two primary forms of affective inequality: a) inequalities in the doing of love, care and solidarity work, and b) inequalities in the receipt of love, care and solidarity. These two forms of affective inequality are exacerbated by other dimensions of inequality. Lack of respect and recognition for care-related work exacerbates the inequalities involved in having to take a disproportionate responsibility for the burdensome aspects of love, care and solidarity. A culture in which care work is not recognised and rewarded also disempowers and impoverishes carers of all kinds. Having a low income and limited resources, either independently of being a carer or because of it, also makes care work more burdensome. It limits options for assigning some of the care tasks to others, and may leave carers with little time for rest or even energy to enjoy the pleasurable aspects of love, care and solidarity work. Those who are assigned responsibility for love and care work are often powerless to determine the conditions under which they do this work, especially in the family sphere. Their powerlessness exacerbates the inequalities between themselves and those who are not carers by binding them to the necessity of caring and denying them the opportunity to
exercise autonomy in other spheres of life.

Inequality in the doing of love, care and solidarity work is but one dimension of affective inequality. The second dimension operates when people are denied access to the benefits of love, care and solidarity. Those who are denied love and attention in their intimate lives, or who do not have access to secondary forms of caring, be it from friends, neighbours, kin, colleagues or important service providers (such as teachers and health workers), or who live in societies that have little solidarity in terms of the distribution of wealth and other privileges, are denied access to crucial social goods. Inequalities between individuals, groups and societies can be mapped in terms of the degrees to which love, care and solidarity are available respectively to each.

*Mapping Affective Inequalities on to the Issues of Redistribution, Recognition and Representation: an Equality Studies Framework*

The affective world does not operate autonomously. Not only do affective relations play a central role in framing how people are loved and cared for, so do economic, cultural and power relations. States where public support for primary care and love work is minimal place great stresses on love and care relations (Dodson, 2007). States that provide good supports for caring and carers have superior mental and physical health records among children and adults than those that do not (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). It is not possible to address problems of inequality or social justice in one social system therefore without addressing
these in related social systems. Inequalities are intersectional because people have multi-dimensional, structurally framed identities that are constantly in flux.

Figure 1 below maps out the relationship between the affective system and economic, political, cultural systems, and between each of these and the dimensions of equality/inequality to which they are related. What is clear is that the generative sources of injustice vary between economic, political, cultural and affective spheres. Each system generates different forms of inequality which must be considered both discretely and intersectionally in any holistic model of justice.

Not only does in/equality vary across systems and processes, the ways in which systems and processes impact on different groups varies. Thus, while social class inequalities are generated in the economic system, they are not confined to this. They are regenerated in the cultural system through the ways in which cultural tastes are class stratified, as the accents, dress, tastes, literature and music etc., of working class people are culturally defined as inferior to those of the middle and upper classes (Bourdieu 1984, Skeggs 2004, Sayer 2005a). In addition, working class people experience a moral judgment of themselves as socially lesser; this judgment has an affective outcome as people experience the shame and embarrassment of being judged of lower moral worth (Sayer 2005b). Equally, while children could be defined as the prototypically powerless group in society, the injustices they experience are not confined to that system as poverty studies show that children are disproportionately poorer than adults (Central Statistics Office 2007). Thus, the final form(s) of inequality any given group experience will
not be confined to one dimension (see Baker et al. 2009: 62-70 for a detailed discussion of this).

The intersectionality of inequalities is also played out in the affective domain. Undertaking a heavy burden of unpaid care work has serious health implications for carers most of whom are women (Cannuscio et al. 2004; Hirst 2003; Strazdins et al. 2004). It also impacts on the ability of carers to engage in paid employment thereby impacting on their economic resources and indirectly generating a re/distributive injustice in the economic sphere.

Equally, those deprived of primary care over prolonged periods of time experience serious emotional deprivations that impact not on only their mental health and status, but on their abilities to learn, to earn a living, and thereby to exercise power and control over their lives, including through having sufficient economic resources (Feeley 2009; Lynch et al. 2009).
### Figure 1
Four key systems where in/equality is generated mapped with four key dimensions of in/equality and related processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Systems where in/equality is generated</th>
<th>Dimensions of In/Equality</th>
<th>Processes for promoting In/equality</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resources (Re/distribution)</td>
<td>Respect and Recognition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic System</td>
<td>XX</td>
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<td>Political System</td>
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<td>Affective System</td>
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Two XXs denote a major site for generating inequality in that system while a single X denotes a lesser site where the particular inequality arises.
Adapted from Baker, J. K. Lynch et al. (2009) *Equality: From Theory to Action*

Not only is injustice derived from the ways *relations* operate within systems, it is also derived from the way *processes* for achieving equality operate within and between systems, including the ways in which the burdens and pleasures of different forms of work and education are distributed. In *Equality: From Theory to Action*, we refer to this as working and learning as equals:
In contemporary societies, both the burdens and benefits of work are unequally distributed, and those who shoulder the greatest burdens often receive the least benefit. The burden of menial work is generally accompanied by the lowest possible wages and working conditions. The burdens of caring in individual households are typically unpaid, unrecognized and carried out with little support…. (Baker et al. 2009: 39).

Thus economic injustice is not just about what income or resources one receives, it is also about the processes that operate in determining how one receives them, whether or not one is always confined to undertaking difficult and/or boring, dirty or tiring work. The unequal division of labor, including that within and between paid and unpaid care labour, is what Sayer (2009: 102) has termed a contributive injustice: “What we are allowed to contribute, particularly in terms of work, is at least as important as what we get, because the kind of work that we do has such a fundamental effect on the kinds of people we become, and on the quality of our lives” (2009:102).

*The Relational Realities of Caring, Loving and Solidarity: their implications for Justice*

Love, care and solidarity are productive forces not only emotionally but also materially (Hardt and Negri 2009). Studies of countries operating public polices involving the equalisation of wealth and income show that people are healthier and have higher levels of well-being in more equal and solidarity-led societies (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; Dorling 2010). Equally, we know from psychology,
that experiencing love and care at the personal level is vital for producing emotionally and mentally healthy persons, and that the latter, in turn, influences physical health and well being enabling people to work and function more effectively in all areas of life. Given the primacy of love, care and solidarity for human well being, it is important to comment on them further here (see Lynch, 2007 for an in-depth analysis).

There are three major life-worlds or circles of relational care work (Figure 2). First, there is the world of primary, intimate relations where there is strong attachment, interdependence, depth of engagement and intensity; the prototypical relationship in this circle is that between parents and children. Even if little love labour is invested by the parties to this intimate world, or if there is abuse or neglect, these relationships retain a high level of emotional significance. Secondary care relations involve outer circles of relatives, friends, neighbours and work colleagues where there are lower order affective engagements in terms of time, responsibility, commitment and emotional engagement. Tertiary care relations involve largely unknown others for whom people have care responsibilities through statutory obligations at national or international levels, or for whom people care politically or economically through volunteering or activism. Within each of these circles of care, people live in varying states of dependency and interdependency. And each care reality is intersectionally connected to the other, moving along a fluid continuum from care-full-ness to care-less-ness.
The world of care is not an isolated and autonomous sphere however. It is deeply interwoven with economic, political and cultural relations, and inequalities in the latter can undermine the capacities and resources to do love, care and solidarity work (Baker et al. 2009). It is no accident of history, that those in prison are not only disproportionately from very poor households, but are also
very likely to have suffered severe care deprivations and to have lacked equality of access to education and other social goods (Feeley 2009; O’Mahony 1997, Wacquant 2009). Structural injustices exacerbate affective deprivations and vice versa.

In primary care relations, labours of abuse and neglect can replace love labouring, not only denying someone the benefits of love labour but damaging the person emotionally and physically (Feeley 2009). Moreover, the moral imperative on women to be caring within the heterosexual family (O’Brien 2007) imposes a burden in primary care terms that does not apply to men (Ferguson 1989; Jónasdóttir 1994). Equally in the secondary care relations fields, other-centred care labouring may or may not take place. Highly competitive work environments do not generate cultures of care and concern among colleagues (Ball 2003). Neighborhoods mired by poverty or violence are not likely to produce the kind of trust that underpins neighbourly care or so-called ‘social capital’ (Leonard 2004). In the global or national sphere of social action, opportunities to express solidarity through forms of fair trade, debt cancellation or the curbing of sex trafficking are greatly undermined when governments and multi-lateral agencies conspire against them in their own interests. There is therefore nothing inevitable in the love, care and solidarity (LCS) world; the relational sphere provides contexts where they can be either fostered or destroyed.

*The Ethical, the Affective and Politics*
Human beings are ethical, committed and emotional, as well as economic, political and cultural; the sets of values that govern people’s actions in everyday life and the emotions that accompany them are central to how people live and define themselves (Sayer 2005b: 5-12). People struggle in their choices between what is good and the not-so-good (Dodson 2010); their lives are governed by rules of lay normativity in much of their social action (Sayer 2005b: 35-50). Because human beings live in affective relational realities, they also have emotional ties and bonds that can reinforce their motivation to act as moral agents, to act ‘other wise’ rather than ‘self wise’ (Tronto 1991, 1993). To say this is not to deny the fact that people can and do disregard feelings for others in all relations; they can and do behave indifferently, neglectfully and abusively. One of the defining struggles in the lay normative world is the struggle over how to balance concerns and commitment to others with self-interests tapping into and managing corresponding emotions.

Given the complex character of human relationality however, social actions are not simply interest-led in the economic, power and status sense. While interests do play a role in framing choices and actions, people are evaluative; they make moral judgments about what matters to them in terms of their relationships, money, work and/or leisure. While people are egotistical, they are not simply egotists. Even in a neo-liberal capitalist society “people are ‘often moved by a quite different set of motives, arising directly out of consideration for the claims of others. They act from a sense of justice, from friendship, loyalty, compassion, gratitude, generosity, sympathy, family affection and the like…” (Midgley 1991:
5)’ though these latter motives are not necessarily dominant in practice” (Sayer 2011: 172 citing Midgley). Because people have relational nurturing (nurtured) identities as carers and cared-for persons, their decisions are influenced by their love, care and solidarity priorities and values, albeit in complex and inconsistent ways (Dodson 2010; Lynch et al., 2009). Recognition of their vulnerability as human beings undoubtedly drives self-interest in the traditional economic sense, but it also drives people as moral and relational agents. In recognising their own vulnerability, people can come to see the vulnerability of others.

**Relations of love, care and solidarity matter not only for what they can produce personally (or what their absence of abuse can do negatively to persons, communities or societies) but for what they might generate politically in terms of heralding different ways of relating beyond separatedness, competition and aggrandisement.**

**Postscript: The Normative and the Affective in the Social Sciences**

In contemporary sociological theory there is a tension between the normative and the analytical, and between fact and value. While maintaining the separation between fact and value is vital to avoid representing *a priori* assumptions and values as empirically valid ‘truths’, the dichotomy also presents unique problems in social scientific analysis. Facts are not devoid of value: by naming a gender or sexuality-related inequality we are not just making empirical statements; the empirical statement declares the issue of gender to be important and deserving of analytical investigation.
However, the normative intent implied in empirical analyses of inequality is not made explicit in most empirical research (nor indeed are omissions or exclusions noted). By not explicitly addressing the normative issues arising, and the inevitable political and economic issues to which these give rise (by virtue of both inclusion and exclusion), the role of the normative as a subject for research investigation is neglected (Sayer 2011: 23-58). Such an approach also eschews research interest in the affects associated with normative judgments and relatedly with affective relations in social life that drive normative intent. Yet, human beings are not emotionally and morally detached entities. Social actors are not only interest-led, power-led or status-led. They can and do make moral choices. These choices are often driven by their affective ties even though they may appear illogical or contentious (Dodson, 2010; Lynch et al. 2009). By not naming the normative dimensions of social life and their interface with affective relations, social and political sciences are attempting to explain human choices within the confines of a Marxist Weberian trilogy that is insufficiently cogniscent of affective and moral relations.\(^iv\)

A political space for new modes of political engagement, redefining the public from the inside out rests in affective relations. There is scope to direct political desire towards an admission of vulnerability and othercentredness. While economic and other self interests will inevitably play a role in desire, there is scope to define desires relationally not least by naming and recognising the collective (and ultimately individual) benefit of solidarity. While there are multiple challenges creating solidarity within nation state borders (defining is a
legitimate ‘who’ of solidarity) and even greater ones still defining the legitimate
‘who’ of social justice between nation states (Fraser 2008: 30-47), these are issues
for political consideration and deliberation that could be addressed through the
development of new political institutions governed by a critical-democratic
approach (ibid). As noted by Fraser, given global interdependency economically
and environmentally (and increasingly politically), drawing a neat dichotomy
between the moral and the political in defining the parameters of solidarity
obligations is highly contestable.

Although many might claim that it is utopian to suggest solidarities beyond
nation-state borders, or even within nation states, the relative success of
distributive justice policies in states as culturally diverse as Sweden and Japan in
the post-World War II era does challenge the assumptions that the ‘who’ of
solidarity can never change (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). The success of worker-
owner cooperatives in Mondragon in Spain (and in many other areas of the world)
where profits are placed second to job security for all members’ and where there
is commitment to communities that are not directly self-invested, is another example
of how solidarity has worked within nation states and is now extending beyond
them (Sanchez Bajo and Roelants 2011). The fact that the European states of
Germany and France are working collaboratively for over 50 years to develop the
European Union, after two long and ferocious wars, is also proof that
transnational solidarity is not impossible, even if this solidarity is fractured,
contentious, problematic and open to constant negotiation.
To recognise the salience of affective relationality, and the morality that flows from it, for human choices and actions is not to suggest that relationality is disinterested or driven by simple altruism. Relational beings are simultaneously living in an autonomous space; they are both self-interested and other-directed. People are individuals-in-relation, not separate and soluble persons (England 2005). And being self-interested in the classical economic sense may indeed be what enables people to be other-centred in other spheres of life; autonomy is not the enemy of relationality. Neither is relationality the enemy of autonomy; people who are engaged with the interests of others are more sensitive to their needs and desires and this knowledge of others gives one power to service the other and to be rewarded in turn by reciprocal appreciation and action.

While Fraser’s work over the last 20 years has greatly advanced understanding of the operation of social justice systems and their intersectionality, there is a need to recognize the fourth affective dimension of justice not least in order to respect the principle of parity of participation which Fraser (2008: 145-6) so strongly endorses. Affective relations are of profound political importance, not only because they exist sociologically as sites of social practice, but also because of the interface between these and redistributive, recognition and representational realities in generating discrete forms of inequality.

Taking account of affective relations and their role in framing human choices is fundamental to reframing justice. Recognising the role of affective relations would involve recognizing that human motivations are not solely driven by the
ethics of competition and self-interest. It would raise the principle of other-centeredness to a new standing, which might help contain the principle of rational economic interest and challenge the politics of fear, both of which are central to contemporary capitalism. It could, over time, create a political discourse that would enable people to think ‘other-wise’ rather than ‘self-wise’. This would help drive economic and social policy in a way that is ethical, in the sense that it is focused on the care-of-the-other in the context of caring of the self. Given the global financial crisis and failed politics of global capitalism, the need for a new ethics governing politics has never been so urgent.

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i Similar assumptions inform the sociological analysis of injustice be it within the neo-Weberian (Tilly, 1998) or the neo-Marxist tradition (Wright, 2010).

ii Love relations refer to relations of high interdependency where there is greatest attachment, intimacy and responsibility over time. They arise from inherited or contractual dependencies or interdependencies and are primary care relations. Secondary care relations are lower order interdependency relations. While they involve care responsibilities and attachments, they do not carry the same depth of moral obligation in terms of meeting dependency needs, especially long-term dependency needs. There is a degree of choice and contingency about secondary care relations that does not apply to primary relations. Solidarity relations do not involve intimacy. They are the political form or social form of love relations. Sometimes solidarity relations are chosen, such as when individuals or groups work collectively for the well being of others whose welfare is only partially or not immediately related to their own, or solidarity can be imposed through laws or moral prescriptions that are collectively binding. While most people can readily identify the value of love and care at the personal level, there is less understanding of solidarity. Solidarity is the more political or public face of affective relations. It finds expression in the values a society upholds in support of others who are not autonomous. It is both a set of values and a set of public practices. It connotes the work that is involved in creating and maintaining local communities, neighborhoods on the one hand, and the advocacy work in civil society for
social justice and human rights at local, national and global levels at the other. The levels of solidarity in a given society are reflected in everything from the vibrancy of its community activities to the taxes people are willing to pay to fund and support vulnerable members of their own and other societies. It is where the moral, the affective and the political systems overlap in public life (for a fuller discussion see Lynch, 2007)

vi Heterosexual, lesbian and homosexual relations between couples is also potentially a primary site of intimacy. However, “The way heterosexual relations are institutionalized in contemporary society means that love’s two elements - care and ecstatic – find themselves in continuous opposition …. ” in a way that that is highly disadvantageous to women who are “‘forced’ to commit themselves to loving care - so that men can be able to live/experience ecstasy” (Jonasdottir 1994: 102)

iv The evidence from both Bourdieu (1986) and from Putnam (1995) shows that human bonding (solidarity) has both negative and positive dimensions to it. Social capital is a means to power through networking and is often deliberately exclusionary in terms of how it is often deployed as ‘bonding capital’; it is however potentially inclusionary in terms of ‘bridging capital’

v This is most evident in the cooperative banks in Quebec (Canada) in France, the Netherlands and Germany – all of which have survived the financial crash since 2008 in a way commercial banks have not (Sanchez Bajo and Roelants, 2011).