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Abstract
This article explores the emotional dimension of public participation. It contrasts the understanding of deliberative forums as spaces in which reasoned argument is intended to lead to good policy making, with the importance of values and emotions in motivating action within social movements. In the context of a widening of the participatory sphere and the increasing likelihood that social movement activists will also take part in officially sponsored participation initiatives, it considers the significance of the emotional content of experiences that service users and citizens bring to discussions about policy and service delivery. Drawing on a feminist ethic of care it suggests criteria for assessing the capacity of deliberative practices to encompass an emotional morality and to deliver on aspirations for enhanced well-being, welfare and social justice.

Key words: deliberation, emotions, ethic of care, social movements

Introduction
The expansion of participatory governance has created multiple forums within which citizens, service users and public officials discuss issues of welfare and well-being. These forums have been characterized as partnerships, invited spaces, contested spaces, deliberative spaces, spaces for change (e.g. Cornwall and Coelho, 2007). In this article I consider these as emotional spaces: spaces in which identities are negotiated, constructed and possibly transformed, righteous anger, pain and frustration are expressed, and hopes and aspirations are pursued. My approach here is less concerned with the emotional dynamics of interaction within participatory forums (Thompson and Hoggett, 2001; van Stokkom, 2005), than with the relationship between the emotional content of the issues being debated and the capacity of dialogue within these forums to realize...
welfare, well-being and justice. As the distinction between invited and free spaces becomes increasingly fluid because of the adoption of ‘empowerment’ and participation as official policy, it is important to understand what happens to those who try to operate in both arenas: as activists within social movement organizations and participants within officially sponsored deliberative forums. It is also important to consider what kind of spaces might be necessary to encompass the emotional dimension of the experiences of those subject to social policies who seek to draw from personal experience to inform social policy making.

By way of introduction, the issues I will be exploring can be illustrated with two incidents from studies of such forums. The first comes from a study I conducted of a citizens’ jury in Belfast (Barnes, 1999). This was convened to explore citizens’ views about proposed changes to the structure of health and social care services. In order to evaluate this process I observed deliberations, collected data about immediate responses to the process from jurors, and undertook telephone interviews with jurors, witnesses and those who commissioned the jury a few weeks after this had taken place. During an interview a health service manager who had acted as a witness made an observation that ran counter to much of the received wisdom at the time about the value of deliberative forums such as citizens’ juries. This woman had previous experience of public consultations on health and health service issues and compared the citizens’ jury experience unfavourably with public meetings. She commented on the absence of opportunities for interaction with members of the jury and described the process as one in which the jurors posed questions, because that was what they were there to do, and she answered them. There was no follow up discussion and she had no sense of why the questions were asked, or whether they reflected broadly held views amongst the jurors. She contrasted this with public meetings which are often characterized by angry people coming with views to express, but where she felt she understood more about what those views were and why they were held, and thus more able to provide a helpful response and engage in an exchange about this than she did in the citizens’ jury.

The other example concerns the dynamics of psychiatric survivor participation in a legislation subcommittee with responsibilities for implementing proposals for community mental health services in Canada (Church, 1996). Many of the officials involved in this process found the angry and emotional input from service users very hard to handle. One young woman started to cry as she told her story and
challenged officials to act quickly because if they didn’t it would be too late for her – she would be dead. Officials thought the approach adopted by service users was too confrontational and tried to rule personal stories – that they described as ‘horror stories’ – as outside the remit of the committee. Questioning of officials was described as ‘grilling’ and overall the behaviour of service users was constructed as ‘bad manners’. Church concluded that the service users were not so much rude as playing from a different standard for politeness and reason. She wrote:

. . . they used the public hearings to express the pain in their lives. They wanted a professional/bureaucratic response to the emotional as well as the cognitive aspects of their speaking out. The fact that they rarely received it was more than a breach of decorum. (p. 41)

Thus, in the first case, we see the absence of emotion amongst the jurors being cited as grounds for questioning the authenticity of their interest in the issues they are deliberating. There is a sense that they are ‘going through the motions’, that they do ‘not really care’ about the issues in any significant sense. In the other example the presence and expression of emotion is considered to rule much of what is being said as ‘outside the remit’ of the committee and as evidence of bad manners on the part of the participants. This suggests emotionality is linked to ways of assessing the authenticity of both the motivations and style of participants, but that these judgements may be contested.

In this article I will address the theory and practice of two different modes of participation: action within social movements and participation in deliberative forums constituted by public officials to involve ‘the public’ in policy making and service delivery. Focusing on the significance of emotionality within both contexts I will illustrate the tensions that are evident when social movement activists take part in deliberative policy making. I will then offer a perspective from relational ethics that I suggest offers a way of broadening our conception of deliberative practice that might resolve such tensions – at least at an analytical level, but which may also perhaps offer a clue about practical ways of achieving a better understanding between officials and citizens in such contexts and of enabling deliberation to deliver welfare, well-being and justice.
Emotions, identity and social movements

Different social movement theorists offer different explanations for why people take part. The perspective I am adopting draws primarily from a socio-cultural perspective, emphasizing the significance of value systems, the way in which actors make sense of their own situations and their responses to dissatisfactions with institutional or broader social norms, rather than from a position deriving from rational choice theory (see e.g. Crossley, 2002: ch. 4). However, theorists who have argued that it is necessary to bring emotions back in to the understanding of motivations for participation in social movements and the strategies adopted within them can take both cultural and structural positions on this issue (Goodwin et al., 2001; Kemper, 2001).

Those who are better integrated into social networks are more likely to be recruited to social movements (Della Porta and Diani, 1999). The significance of social networks in affecting individual decisions to get involved, as well as the significance of networks in sustaining social movements, has been extensively researched (Diani and McAdam, 2003). The extent, intensity and overlap between various types of networks are important and there is not a simple linear relationship between networks, community and movement participation. For Melucci and other cultural theorists who reject rational choice theory, networks represent the context in which interactions between individuals produce both the cognitive and affective schemas that can connect individuals to collective action (1996: 65). This suggests the importance of understanding the nature of the social relationships of those who become engaged in action not only in structural terms, but also at a micro level. Kemper (2001) argues that structural relationships of power and status can explain the emergence of emotions such as fear, anger, resentment and hope that help explain why social movements arise, amass and sustain necessary levels of support. But he does not address the specific contexts within which individuals experiencing such emotions actually decide to get involved. It is within social networks and relationships that we might find the production of motivations for participation – a concept which can be distinguished from the ‘incentives’ that rational choice theorists invoke in explaining the evaluation of costs and benefits of participation, and which has an affective as well as a cognitive dimension.

There are two aspects of this that are of particular significance for my argument here. The first concerns the significance of values as...
motivating factors in participation and in constructing identities, and the second relates to what have been variously referred to as ‘stigmatized’ or ‘spoiled’ identities. I will start with the issue of values.

Gecas (2000) suggests that the significance of values as a basis for identity has been neglected in comparison with social structural contexts for identity formation. He argues ‘... an equally strong case can be made for the significance of value identities, in linking individuals to cultural systems and to social groups or collectivities with similar value identities, as is typically the case in social movements’ (p. 94). However, he also recognizes the interplay between group and value based identities as the valuing of group or role identities can be incorporated into value systems, many role identities have value components (such as the caring associated with nurses) and group membership usually implies values such as solidarity and loyalty. The distinction between role or group based identity and value based identity is that value based identities are less situation specific and usually transcend membership of any specific group or occupation of any specific role.

Values have both cognitive and affective dimensions and the emotionally charged nature of values can provide a strong motivation to action. Emotions can sustain commitments and lead those who experience them to accept courses of action that would not be taken by those who do not share such emotions (Barbalet, 2006). Goodwin et al. (2001: 6) suggest ‘Cognitive agreement alone does not result in action’ and consider the significance of emotions such as anger or outrage at injustice in generating the frames through which common objectives can be defined as a basis for action. Examples of this from research I conducted with colleagues (Barnes et al., 2006b, 2007) include activists in an initiative to develop fuel poverty strategies who were driven by, for example, the injustice of old people dying of cold, and participants in a Local Agenda 21 Sustainability Forum who were passionately committed to green issues. Distinctions have been drawn between ‘instrumental’ and ‘terminal’ values corresponding with a ‘means’ ‘end’ distinction (Rokeach, 1979). Terminal values, such as ‘freedom’ or ‘social justice’ also signify desired goals and underpin political, philosophical or religious systems of values – the ideologies that provide a frame and a common vocabulary within which social movement participants develop their objectives and plan their strategies. The development of collective identities within social movements is given meaning by the shared worldview which offers a moral basis on which action is
built and which becomes a significant reference point for individuals’ sense of who they are.

The second part of this analysis relates to social movements that are more obviously based around shared identities and that have particular relevance to the field of social welfare. Collective action amongst those whose identities relate in part to poor health, abusive experiences and/or dependency on welfare services can be built around various negative or damaging experiences:

- The pain and fear associated with illness, disability and, in some cases, ageing.
- Shame, fear and self-loathing resulting from physical or sexual abuse.
- Frustration and anger associated with receiving services that are disrespectful, unresponsive or which undermine people’s sense of who they are.
- Lack of recognition of people as autonomous agents capable of making their own decisions.
- Experience of discrimination, stigmatization and injustice in their daily lives.

There is evidence of the significance of collective action both motivated by and transforming such experiences amongst different groups: for example, people who live with mental health problems (Barnes and Bowl, 2001; Barnes and Shardlow, 1996); survivors of child sexual abuse (Whittier, 2001); adolescents in the transition to adulthood (Kaplan and Liu, 2000); women experiencing post-partum depression (Taylor, 2000); and disability (Campbell and Oliver, 1996). Action in social movements is motivated not only by emotionally charged negative experiences, but also by anger at experienced injustices. A key purpose and outcome of collective action is the generation of a positive identity out of what some have called ‘spoiled identities’, of positive emotions such as anger and pride out of shame and fear. Participation in such activities can be directly related to well-being. The following words of activists in a mental health user group indicate the significance of this:

In some ways it turned out to be a positive step for me. It changed my life around from something that was killing me, virtually, to something that I finally got some kind of reward in.
It’s given me a life and without it I wouldn’t have dreamed of doing half the things I do now. It’s given me confidence, assurance . . . I get up now and speak at a conference quite happily. A few years ago I would have no more done that than fly! (Barnes and Shardlow, 1996)

Drawing on research exploring organization amongst mothers experiencing post-partum depression Taylor (2000) identifies the way in which the development of solidarity with others elicits what she refers to as ‘vitalising’ emotions – emotions such as pride and joy with the group’s new positive collective self definition. Similarly Whittier (2001) highlights the politicized emotional interpretation of the experience of coming out amongst child sexual abuse sufferers that can transform fear and shame into empowerment and resistance. This is explicit in the adoption of the term ‘Mad Pride’ amongst some within the mental health user movement. A key strategy in this respect (which was first fully articulated within the women’s movement) is the sharing of personal experiences and allowing, indeed encouraging, participants to express the fear, anxiety, guilt or other emotions that characterize their response to living with mental illness.

Within the disability movement the dominant emotion motivating early organization was anger at discrimination and injustice, that is, a more obviously politically focused emotion than those evident in other groups highlighted here (Barnes, 1991). However, more recently disabled activists have started to question the adequacy of an approach that downplays the significance of impairment and this opens up the possibility for more personal emotions to find their place within disability activism (Shakespeare, 2006).

In some cases, for example collective action amongst lay carers, gaining recognition for a new social identity is a central purpose of organization (Barnes, 1997: ch. 5). That has both a political dimension, claiming rights for service support in their own right, and a personal dimension, offering spaces in which those who may have been isolated can experience both practical and emotional support. The following quote from a woman who had cared for a son with both learning difficulties and mental health problems demonstrates the way in which finding others with similar experiences can offer a sense of being part of a ‘community’:

We have weekly meetings and you actually feel, it’s like being in a foreign country and nobody understands the lingo you speak. Then all of a sudden you come back home and everybody understands. (Barnes, 2006: 127)
In summary, my argument here is that action within social movements requires an understanding of the emotionality that both motivates and is generated by action. The emotional dynamics will be different in different contexts and emotionality is linked both to values and to the nature of the identity experiences that motivate participation. But in both contexts emotions are central to the purpose and the processes of organizing. We should not then be surprised if social movement activists bring emotionally charged perspectives into deliberative arenas when they move into those spaces.

Deliberation

I now turn to consider the way in which deliberation has been theorized in the context of the ‘participatory turn’ in governance (e.g. Dryzek, 2000; Fishkin, 1991). In setting out key aspects of ‘deliberative democracy’ it is important to understand that the ‘deliberative ideal’ has now been extensively demonstrated to be unachievable in practice (see e.g. Davies et al., 2006) and that the concept of ‘deliberation’ may be used loosely in referring to a range of participatory practices, many of which are not designed explicitly to follow the tenets of deliberative practice. But the ideal has had a considerable impact in shaping a new imaginary of what participative policy making might look like.

Deliberation aims to bring decision making out of the hidden back rooms in which bargaining takes place between interest groups, and enable ‘ordinary citizens’ to engage in dialogue with both the issues and the decision makers. The practice of deliberative democracy is intended to open knowledge previously restricted to specific scientific or other communities to lay scrutiny, as well as to open up political arenas to more direct processes of citizen involvement. Underlying such initiatives is the belief that technical or expert knowledge alone is inadequate to the resolution of policy problems, since the issues such problems raise are also political and ethical. Thus it has an educative purpose, creating a more informed citizenry who are better able to engage with the complex issues which form the substance of policy making. It also has a cohesive purpose as it is believed to generate better decisions that hold greater legitimacy because they are more open and informed, and because the intention is that participants will arrive at a consensus about the best course of action or the most appropriate position.
to adopt in order to achieve the greatest public good (Bobbio, 2003). Where it is not possible to arrive at a shared position there should be an account of the reasoning that led to the different conclusions reached by different participants. Deliberation aims to make transparent the reasoning behind positions that are adopted and to enable reflection on the differences that emerge through the process of debate. This notion of transforming views, rather than simply aggregating preferences (as happens in voting) is central to the concept of deliberative democracy. In this respect Young (2000) argues for the importance of democratic practices that increase the chances that people will move from positions based in self-interest to those that are more likely to deliver social justice as a result of having to listen directly to others whose positions and circumstances are different from their own.

In order to achieve all the above, Habermas (1984) prescribed what he referred to as ‘an ideal speech situation’ as a necessary condition for deliberation. This requires that anyone who is competent to speak and act is allowed to take part in the process of deliberation; that all those taking part in the process of deliberation are allowed to introduce any assertion they wish to make and to question any assertion made by others; all are allowed to express their attitudes and wishes; and no speaker should be prevented from exercising those rights – either as a result of internal or external pressure.

The privileging of reasoned argument by theorists of deliberative democracy has led to the design of deliberative spaces that are intended to create the conditions outlined above. This has been interpreted in some cases to mean that those with a particular interest in the topic being deliberated should be excluded and has led to what might be considered a self-censoring process to avoid raising issues that might generate heated disagreement (Barnes, 1999).

However, Young (2000) suggests that assuming that deliberation has to be based solely in reason – which is usually defined as neutral and dispassionate, and conducted solely through rational argument – will exclude many people. She argues instead for the importance of recognizing and valuing other styles of speech in deliberative processes and identifies greeting, rhetoric and storytelling as modes of speech that are excluded by deliberative theorists. For example, the concept of ‘greeting’ or public acknowledgement is absent in those cases where individuals or groups who have tried to make claims in public forums have found themselves ignored, stereotyped or otherwise insulted; while telling individual stories of experiences (narrating) can often be dismissed
as ‘mere anecdotes’ rather than valid evidence. Experience of initiatives to secure the involvement of, for example, older people and mental health service users clearly demonstrates the way in which storytelling can be dismissed and delegitimized as a basis on which to draw conclusions about policy and service issues (Barnes, 2004; Church, 1996). Rhetoric, a committed and passionate attempt to persuade others, is usually regarded as aiming to manipulate rather than to reflect a genuine expression of the emotional meaning and content of the position being represented.

Young argues that situating deliberation, rhetoric, narrative and greeting in relation to one another provides a more sophisticated understanding of the elements that may be necessary to enable dialogue between citizens and public officials to take place in a way that is capable of generating alternative discourses and transforming policy making. Empirical work such as that by Davies et al. (2006) also identifies the way in which emotional engagement with a topic (on the part of both ‘witnesses’ and citizens) can enhance cognitive engagement and thus enhance deliberation. Their study of the Citizens’ Council of NICE (National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence) indicated that exchanges were more deliberative in style ‘when the content under discussion concerned concrete cases and when they were responding to strong invested statements from witnesses and could identify and mobilise their own strongly held opinions in response’ (p. 129).

**Social movement activists in deliberative forums**

The ‘new spaces’ that have been created to enhance public participation in policy making are unfamiliar territory to most of those who take part. As I have suggested some deliberative practices, such as citizens’ juries, aim to exclude anyone who might be regarded as having a ‘special interest’ in the topic under debate and thus those known to be active in social movement organizations, voluntary sector organizations or professional associations that are relevant to the topic would be disallowed. But these highly formalized deliberative practices are not typical and such exclusions do not apply to many of the participatory initiatives that have been developed by local government, the NHS and other public bodies and that are influenced by the deliberative ideal. Indeed, recruitment may often involve identifying relevant groups and
organizations and inviting representatives from these. Thus many of those who do take part in such initiatives have experiences in other contexts where the objectives – which include those of influencing and shaping public policies or service delivery, are similar (Barnes et al., 2007). These experiences derive from involvement in diverse groups and organizations that might be considered to constitute social movements, in more traditional forms of politics and trades union activity, and in voluntary sector organizations which encompass campaigning activities. People bring to deliberative forums experiences of how they operate in other contexts and this influences the way in which they respond to the opportunities offered by these new spaces and indeed the way in which such spaces are themselves constituted (Barnes, 2005; Davies et al., 2006).

This clearly generates tensions that relate substantially to the way in which emotion is handled in such contexts. This was evident in the example of the Canadian mental health policy process discussed in the introduction. Another example from the mental health sphere was a facilitator of a mental health service user council in a psychiatric hospital ‘translating’ the angry words of users in order to avoid negative responses from psychiatrists and being rebuked by users as a result (Barnes and Wistow, 1994). A similar focus for conflict was evident in an initiative that intended to engage young people in a deprived neighbourhood in planning a youth conference (Barnes, 2007a). The young people who were members of an autonomous youth forum were angry at what they saw as the injustice meted out to the area in which they lived and saw the youth conference as a way of seeking redress. Youth workers charged with facilitating this process sought to train young people to express their opinions in a way that would not ‘scare’ councillors and local officials. They saw this as an opportunity to educate young people to become responsible participating citizens. The tension between two rather different objectives was focused around the perceived legitimacy of this particular group of young people expressing their feelings in a conflictual manner.

In her study of the child sexual abuse survivor movement Whittier (2001) highlights the very different ways in which emotion is handled in different contexts. In demonstrations and other contexts controlled by the movement emotions of resistance are strongly expressed in a public coming out that is experienced as powerfully transformative. In contrast, survivors appearing in talk shows demonstrated pain and fear, often in a childlike manner – for example by holding teddy bears. This reflected
the construction of talk shows as a route to therapeutic catharsis (see also Lunt and Stenner, 2005). And when activists seek a response from the legal system for the damage that has been done to them: ‘displaying grief, hurt, lack of trust, fear, or shame is virtually mandated in order to be a legitimate subject deserving of compensation’ (Whittier, 2001: 245). The emotion management Whittier describes reflects the different dimensions and purposes of social movements. Movement activists are determining what are the ‘right emotions’ (Stenner, 2005) not only to feel but also to express in different situations. But other evidence discussed in this article suggests that public officials find any emotion – whether it be anger, pain or despair, difficult to handle in the context of deliberation directed at issues of policy or service delivery. The onus on managing emotions thus rests with the service users or citizens taking part, officials can invoke institutional rules and norms to define what is acceptable in contexts they control.

So is it possible to conceive of a deliberative practice that can also accommodate the emotionality of those who choose to engage in social movement organizations because of their commitments to the values pursued in such groups, or because through collective action they are able to develop a positive sense of their own identity? Must deliberation be reserved for circumstances in which the ‘public’ that is engaged is a dispassionate public? If so what are the consequences for any notion that deliberative processes are capable of contributing to social justice and well-being? The evidence from Davies et al.’s (2006) study suggests that it would be a mistake in empirical terms to reserve deliberation for dispassionate participants, but beyond this empirical evidence of the value of emotionality in facilitating deliberation is the question of the morality of excluding those most directly affected by the decisions to be reached through deliberation. Indeed, one of the principles articulated for deliberation is that all those actually or potentially affected by the decisions that flow from such practices should have the opportunity to be involved in the deliberative process. In a social policy context this means those whose lives are most affected by the nature and quality of welfare services and policies, and by the impact of poor health, impairment, poverty, abuse and other experiences which impact negatively on emotional health.

I started this paper by identifying the contested link between emotional expression, authenticity and legitimacy in the context of deliberation. I now want to suggest that we need to understand authenticity as linked both to the value based identities of actors and to
the way in which action within social movements can transform negative into positive identifications. Both processes are emotionally charged. If deliberation is to enable debate on issues that are significant: in terms of the impact of the decisions that flow from such debate on the way in which we live together, in terms of the moral disagreements that characterize politics (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996), and in terms of the life chances and emotional health of those directly affected by decision outcomes, then it must be capable of engaging not only with strongly held views based in different value positions, but with the hurt and anger of those who have experienced unfairness and injustice. Deliberation must be capable of engaging with the emotional content of experiences that are brought into the deliberative sphere. Deliberation cannot be restricted to the purely rational or cognitive because to do so is to exclude many of those directly affected by the policy decisions that may flow from deliberation. This does not mean that ‘rational argument’ should be replaced with a slanging match, but it does mean that the tendency to avoid engaging in issues because they are too emotionally charged, or to rule the emotional content of experience as outside the remit of public deliberation, cannot be acceptable. Participants need to learn how to engage with the consequences of this.

If, as Gutmann and Thompson argue, deliberation requires moral argument with the aim of reaching provisional moral agreement, that I would argue that it has to encompass what I refer to as ‘emotional morality’ – by which I mean recognition and respect for the emotional content of experiences and values and the authentic expression of these as a necessary part of dialogue on issues that are directly relevant to such experiences and values. One reason for this is that the claims that are made in this register are not simply personal claims for individual recognition. Social movement activists do not speak solely for themselves, but to express a position that is shared by many others. They call attention to the situation of all those who, for example, are stigmatized by a diagnosis of mental illness, or who suffer as a result of poor treatment by public services. They seek outcomes that are morally acceptable and capable of contributing to justice and well-being within a context of inequality and moral disagreement.

Gutmann and Thompson (1996: 40) ask ‘If democracy must be moral at its foundations and in its outcomes, then should it not also be moral within its everyday processes?’ How then might we understand the moral processes of deliberative democratic practices that can encompass what I have called emotional morality? Gutmann and
Thompson do not consider emotionality directly, but they do emphasize the necessity of recognizing that moral arguments take place in specific contexts and that the arguments that are pursued begin from where we are and have to appeal to those with whom we now live. This suggests that we need to develop a concept of deliberative democracy that also embraces a relational ethics. Such an ethic – an ethic of care – has been developed by feminist political philosophers. Applying this framework to an analysis of deliberative practices offers a rather different perspective on what might be the criteria for assessing ‘good’ deliberation, that is deliberation that is capable of encompassing the emotional as well as the rational, than criteria that have been formulated on the basis of Habermas’ ‘ideal speech situation’ (Webler, 1995).

**Deliberating with care**

The concept of care has usually been seen to be restricted to the personal and to the realm of service delivery. However, recent feminist work has developed a political analysis of the significance of care and it is this analysis that I draw on here. Tronto and Fisher offer the following definition of care:

> On the most general level we suggest that caring can be viewed as a species activity that includes everything we do to maintain, continue and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web. (cited in Tronto, 1993: 103)

This definition has been criticized for being too all encompassing, but the point behind it is to emphasize that ‘care’ is not solely something that should be present within interpersonal relationships. Both Tronto and Sevenhuijsen (1998) argue that care is as much a political as personal value and Sevenhuijsen and others have considered the value base of social policies and offered ways of analysing such policies within an ethic of care framework (e.g. Sevenhuijsen et al., 2003; Williams, 2001). Key to this analysis is the recognition that not all citizens are equal, but that the achievement of equality is a political goal. This point is eloquently pursued by Eva Feder Kittay (1999) who argues
that equality will remain elusive as long as we hold to universalistic egalitarian traditions and fail to develop approaches to equality that also recognize dependency. Elsewhere I have argued that care performs social and political functions in the context of disadvantaged and oppressed communities and that the work of, for example, community activists and peer advocates can be understood as evidence of care in practice (Barnes, 2007b).

Care is both a value and a practice and a caring orientation is acquired through engaging in caring practices and reflecting and debating the values and virtues necessary for care. Thus the notion of ‘deliberating with care’ can be understood to relate both to the attention given to policy outcomes that are capable of reflecting the contribution of care to justice and well-being, and also to the way in which deliberation takes place. At its most basic Sevenhuijsen (1998) suggests that in the public sphere, care as a democratic practice requires the potential for decision making roles and positions to be open to diverse participants. But I suggest we can go further than this.

Tronto (1993) outlined four moral principles of care:

- **Attentiveness:** to recognize and be attentive to others.
- **Responsibility:** to take responsibility for action.
- **Competence:** caring work should be competently performed.
- **Responsiveness:** the position of the care-receiver should be considered from their perspective.

Sevenhuijsen added a fifth principle: ‘trust’. She argues that trust is always interwoven with power and responsibility and that a willingness to use power in a positive and creative manner is a necessary aspect of care.

These principles can be applied to the process of deliberation in order to suggest what deliberative practices that are capable of encompassing the emotionality of those subject to social policies might look like. Deliberative practices which enable dialogue about different experiences which derive from the disadvantage and marginalization resulting from, for example, disability, old age or mental distress, can encourage attentiveness to such experiences and give recognition to them (see e.g. Barnes, 2004; Barnes et al., 2006a). But such attentiveness requires that public officials are prepared to listen and to hear things that are said in ways that make sense to the speaker – which may well be very different from ways of speaking familiar to public officials. Emotional expressions
emphasize the significance of the issues that are the substance of debate and the particularity of the situations that demand a response. Such emotions provide important information that policy makers need to recognize in determining what action is necessary in order to produce positive outcomes. They then have a responsibility to take action on the basis of this.

The focus on positive outcomes reflects the importance of the principle of competence. An intention to enable people to take part in policy making, and even taking responsibility to provide opportunities for this to happen, but then failing to conduct deliberation in a way that enables people to feel their contributions are recognized and valued, means that the purpose of participation is not fulfilled. Webler (1995) has argued that ‘cognitive competence’ is necessary to creating the ideal speech situation required for deliberation. But if deliberation is to be capable of encompassing emotionality then this implies that ‘affective competence’ is also necessary.

The principle of responsiveness refers to the need to understand how those receiving care respond to it, i.e. it emphasizes care receiving as a key part of the practice of care. But it also recognizes that we do not start from positions of equality – that those who are very young, old and frail, or ill are more vulnerable than many of those who make decisions about their care. Thus it emphasizes the importance of understanding their experiences rather than assuming we can ‘put ourselves in their place’ and so speak on their behalf.

Finally, effective participation requires reciprocal trust (Barnes and Prior, 1998). Disregarding or ruling out of order contributions to debate on the basis that they are not expressed in the right way will undermine such trust and may deepen existing negative self-perceptions.

I suggest that adopting this perspective offers a way of conceptualizing the emotional morality that I have argued is necessary to deliberation in the context of public policy making – particularly with respect to deliberation that is capable of delivering welfare, well-being and justice. Such a morality addresses the likelihood that participants will have an emotional investment in the issues being debated because of the significance of the outcomes for their lives, and understands that emotional expression will often be necessary to communicate the substance of the issues to be addressed. The cognitive emphasis on increasing the information available as a basis on which to enhance understanding prior to reaching decisions will be enhanced by practices that enable
understanding of the consequences of decision making. The potential for transforming the way in which all participants – both citizens and officials – think about policy issues is enlarged, as is the likely level of reciprocal trust between them.

**Conclusion**

In this article I have concentrated on the emotional substance and expression of experiences that service users and citizens bring to the process of deliberation about social policies. I have argued that this represents a legitimate and important contribution to the process of making and assessing social policies and that deliberative forums should be judged on their capacity to encompass such expression. The implication of this is that emotional management should not solely be the responsibility of social movement activists who engage in deliberative forums. Emotion cannot be ruled out of order and public officials cannot claim that good manners dictate that strong feelings be left at the door.

I have not addressed the issue of the emotions that may be felt by public officials in such contexts: either those that relate to their anxiety about how they might handle the emotionality of others, or those deriving from feelings that may reflect something of the experiences expressed to them. Public officials themselves may live with mental health problems, have experienced sexual abuse or be balancing the demands of paid work with unpaid care. They may themselves be activists in social movements. Such an analysis is worth undertaking. Wadsworth and Epstein (1998) have demonstrated the way in which emotional defences can be built up by workers apparently sympathetic to the idea that mental health service users should take part in service planning. In this context it was the emotions of the staff that got in the way of constructive dialogue. But this reinforces the importance of the perspective I have taken here. In officially sponsored deliberation forums officials wield most power. If such spaces are to be routes towards increased well-being and social justice then the key challenge is how to enable those who are often subject to others’ decision making to be heard in ways that make sense to them.
References


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