Care and Justice in the Global Context

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Abstract. Morality is often dismissed as irrelevant in what is seen as the global anarchy of rival states each pursuing its national interest. When morality is invoked, it is usually the morality of justice with its associated moral conceptions of individual rights, equality, and universal law. In the area of moral theory, an alternative moral approach, the ethics of care, has been developed in recent years. It is beginning to influence how some see their global responsibilities.

The field of study known as international relations tries to guide our thinking about the world and about relations between states. On the one hand it has had a normative component from the beginning, concerning itself with avoiding the mistakes that led, for instance, to the First World War (Grant and Newland 1991, 3). On the other hand, it has tried to be an empirical social science, and what is called “realism” has been dominant in international relations for a long time, at least since the Second World War.

It has sometimes been acknowledged that what people think about the morality of a state’s behavior can influence that state’s standing, and thus power. But the world has largely been seen as a global near-anarchy of rival states each pursuing its national interest. This national interest can sometimes be thought to include entering into agreements with other states. But trying to assess what really would be the moral course of action for states to pursue has usually been dismissed as pointless.

Of course, it has not been pointless to everyone, and a number of philosophers and others have concerned themselves with ethics and international affairs.¹ And, in the last decade or so, there seem to have been within the field of international relations, more serious discussions than before of what morality—if it were taken seriously—would require of states. Also,

international law, with its inherent or arguably normative aspects, has, despite serious challenges, continued to grow (Henkin 1989). In short, much work has been done to develop the morality of justice, with its associated moral conceptions of individual rights, equality, and universal law, for the arena of international relations and politics. Global justice has come to be a familiar topic, along with just war.

This is sometimes seen as part of the “third debate” in international relations theory—after the idealism of the first debate, which was replaced by the realism of the second. Also in this third debate within international relations are the very different approaches of critical theory, postmodernism, and feminist theory (Steans 1998). From many such perspectives it is apparent how ideological the “realism” that passed for factual and scientific has been. And receptivity towards new ways of understanding international reality and what to do within it has grown (Keohane 1998).

International relations has been among the last of the social sciences to be affected by the awareness of gender issues that made such strides in the last quarter of the 20th century (Halliday 1991). As J. Ann Tickner (1992, 4) writes, “with its focus on the ‘high’ politics of war and Realpolitik, the traditional Western academic discipline of international relations privileges issues that grow out of men’s experiences; we are socialized into believing that war and power politics are spheres of activity with which men have a special affinity [. . . ]” and to which women are irrelevant. Gradually, however, as the equation of what is human with what is masculine is being questioned, the implications of attending to gender are becoming apparent for this field as for others. It is being shown how “the values and assumptions that drive our international system are intrinsically related to concepts of masculinity [. . . ]” (Tickner 1992, 17).

Meanwhile, within feminist theorizing and in the area of moral theory, an alternative to the ethics of justice has been developed. This alternative moral approach is the ethics of care. It is beginning to influence how philosophers and scholars in international relations and global politics see the world, and our responsibilities.

1. The Ethics of Care

In the last few decades, a very short time in the history of moral theorizing, the ethics of care has given rise to an extensive literature, and has affected many moral inquiries in many areas. It is changing the ways moral problems are often interpreted, and changing what many think the recom-
mended approaches to moral problems ought to be. It offers promising possibilities for improving morality, and quite possibly for understanding what we ought to be doing at the global level.

The ethics of care offers a distinctive challenge to the dominant moral theories—Kantian moral theory, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. Kantian moral theory can most easily be seen as a morality of justice. Its expression in works such as John Rawls’ *A Theory of Justice* is emblematic. And many recent discussions of global justice illustrate the application of this sort of theory to international affairs. It can be seen, for instance, in the work of Charles Beitz, Onora O’Neill, and Thomas Pogge. Such theory requires abstract, universal principles to which all, taken as free, equal, and autonomous individual persons choosing impartially, can agree. It sees justice as the most important basis on which to judge the acceptability of political and social arrangements. It insists on respecting persons through recognition of their rights, and provides moral constraints within which individuals may pursue their interests. It seeks fair distributions of positions of differential power and of the benefits of economic activity.

Utilitarianism is less obviously a morality of justice. It recommends maximizing the utility of all taken as individuals pursuing their own interests. But in its requirement that the utility of each individual is to be seen as of equal importance to that of any other, it tries to build justice into its foundations. And it justifies the political recognition of individual rights as highly conducive to general utility. Like Kantian moral theory’s Categorical Imperative, utilitarianism has one very general universal principle, the Principle of Utility, on which it relies.

The ethics of care differs from these theories in its assumptions, goals, and methods. It is closer to virtue ethics, which has enjoyed a recent revival, and it is sometimes thought to be a kind of virtue ethics (Tessman 2001, McLaren 2001). But the ethics of care is sufficiently different from virtue ethics as well as other theories to be counted, in my view, as a new and distinct kind of moral theory (Held, forthcoming). Of course it has precursors, but it is built on different foundations and has developed in distinctive ways.

Among the characteristics of the ethics of care is its view of persons as relational and as interdependent. Kantian and consequentialist moral theories focus primarily on the rational decisions of agents taken as independent and autonomous individuals. Even virtue theory focuses on individuals and their dispositions. In contrast, the ethics of care sees persons as partly constituted by their relations with others. It pays attention primarily to relations between persons, valuing especially caring relations. Rather than assuming, as do the dominant moral theories, that moral relations are to be seen as entered into voluntarily by free and equal individuals, the ethics of care is developed for the realities, as well, of unequal power and unchosen relations; salient examples are relations between parents and children, but the ethics of care is not limited to such “private” contexts. It understands
how our ties to various social groups and our historical embeddedness are also part of what make us who we are.

For the dominant moral theories, there is attention to individual aims and interests on the one hand, and to universal moral norms on the other. Conflicts between the egoistic desires of the self, and the moral claims of everyone seen from an impartial perspective, are recognized. But anything between these extremes of individual self and all others is virtually invisible. To the ethics of care, in contrast, moral life is populated by caring relations in which the interests of self and other are mingled, and trust is crucial. In caring for her child, for instance, a mother may often be pursuing not her own individual interest, or altruistically her child’s as if it were in conflict with her own, but the mutual interest of both together. And she will characteristically value her child and her relation to the child for their own sakes, not to satisfy her own preferences. Her moral concern may well be not that of all persons universally, but that of the particular others with whom she shares such caring relations. And such caring relations are not limited to the personal contexts of family and friends. They can extend to fellow members of groups of various kinds, to fellow-citizens, and beyond. We can, for instance, develop caring relations for persons who are suffering deprivation in distant parts of the globe. Moral theories that assume only individuals pursuing their own interests within the constraints supplied by universal rules are ill-suited to deal with the realities and values of caring relations and of relational persons.

In sum, then, an ethic of justice focuses on issues of fairness, equality, and individual rights, seeking impartial and abstract principles that can be applied consistently to particular cases. Individual persons are seen as instances of the general and timeless conception of person. In contrast, the ethics of care focuses on attentiveness to context, trust, responding to needs, and offers narrative nuance; it cultivates caring relations. Persons are seen as enmeshed in relations and unique. An ethic of justice seeks fair decisions between competing individual rights and interests. The ethics of care sees the interests of carers and cared-for as importantly shared. While justice protects equality and freedom from interference, care values positive involvement with others and fosters social bonds and cooperation.

In trying to ascertain what we morally ought to do, Kantian moral theory and utilitarianism rely entirely on reason. The ethics of care, instead, appreciates the contribution of the emotions in helping us to understand what morality recommends. For instance, empathy, sensitivity, and responsiveness to particular others may often be better guides to what we ought to do than are highly abstract rules and principles about “all men.” In place of what has traditionally been thought of as “moral knowledge,” Margaret Walker (1989), for instance, advocates “attention, contextual and narrative appreciation, and communication in the event of moral deliberation,”
holding that “the adequacy of moral understanding decreases as its form approaches generality through abstraction”.

From the perspective of law, emotion is seen as a threat to the impartiality law requires; emotion is then to be discounted and dismissed. But from the perspective of care, the social relations that must exist before law can get off the ground are, importantly, a form of caring relations between, say, fellow citizens, or, potentially, fellow members of regions or of the globe.

Dominant moral theories seem to have generalized to what they take to be the whole of morality the outlooks thought to be appropriate for the impartial decisions of judges and legislators, or the pursuits of rational self-interest in the marketplace. The concerns of women in the family have been thought to lie “outside” morality, governed by “natural” inclinations. However, with the rise of women’s reliance on their own experiences and feminist insights, the relevance to morality of the concerns and responsibilities of caring, in the family and far beyond, have been appreciated. And it is becoming apparent that this requires profound changes in the way morality is understood.

In my view, the ethics of care should not be thought of as a naturalized ethic, as some of its advocates propose. To provide the full normativity of this approach, persons engaged in caring activities and relations, as I see them, must be taken to be moral subjects not reducible to the objects of scientific description (Held 2002b, 7–24). But caring persons will draw greatly on the understanding of care that can be developed from actual experiences of caring and being cared for.

2. Care as Practice and Value

There is not yet agreement on the precise meaning of “care” as it figures in the ethics of care, but taking care of a child, providing care for the ill, and caring strongly about how those without adequate food are to be fed are examples. Care is concerned with meeting the needs of those dependent on us, and the ethics of care values caring relations and their associated concerns of trust and mutual responsiveness.

Care is a practice involving the work of care-giving and the standards by which the practices of care can be evaluated. Care must concern itself with the effectiveness of its efforts to meet needs, but also with the motives with which care is provided. Recipients of care sustain caring relations through their responsiveness—the look of satisfaction in the child, the smile of the patient. Relations between persons can be criticized when they become dominating, exploitative, mistrustful, or hostile. Relations of care can be encouraged and maintained.

Care is also a value (Held 2003). We value caring relations and caring persons. We can understand many aspects of how persons are interrelated
through a constellation of moral considerations associated with care: mutual concern, trustworthiness, attentiveness, responsiveness. To advocates of the ethics of care, care involves moral considerations at least as important as those of justice. And, when adequately understood, it is an ethics as appropriate for men as for women. Both men and women should acknowledge the enormous value of the caring activities on which society relies, and should share these activities fairly. They should recognize the values of care, as of justice.

One should not equate the ethics of care with feminist ethics. Some feminists are critical of the emphasis on care, seeing it as reinforcing traditional stereotypes of women as selfless nurturers, “naturally” suited to staying home and leaving the “public” sphere to men. Onora O’Neill, for instance, writes that “a stress on caring and relationships [...] may endorse relegation to the nursery and the kitchen, to purdah and to poverty. In rejecting ‘abstract liberalism,’ such feminists converge with traditions that have excluded women from economic and public life” (O’Neill 1992, 55; Okin 1989; Nussbaum 1999). But Fiona Robinson, arguing for the relevance of the ethics of care to international relations, writes that “it is only a narrow, ‘orthodox’ ethics of care—the view of care as essentially a morality for women, belonging in the private sphere [...] to which these criticisms apply” (Robinson 1999, 20). And I agree. The ethics of care has gone far beyond its earliest formulations. Although there are similarities between the ethics of care and communitarianism, and between the ethics of care and Confucianism and what are sometimes thought of as “Asian values,” many now argue that any satisfactory ethics of care, or perhaps even any ethic that deserves the name “ethics of care,” will be a feminist ethics that includes an insistence on the equality of women, not one accepting a traditional gender hierarchy.

3. Justice and Caring Relations

Some writers defending the dominant moral theories acknowledge that care is important and has been neglected. They think a concern for care can be added to theories that focus on justice without requiring significant changes in those theories (Darwall 1998, chap. 19). They see moral terms as requiring universalizability, but think duties to care can be universalized. They continue to hold that impartial principles of justice have priority, but suggest that such principles can permit us to be partial towards our families and friends in appropriate ways, as when we prefer to spend time with one friend rather than another.

Advocates of the ethics of care believe this misunderstands the issues (Held 2001). To the ethics of care, the moral claims of partial caring relations may indeed challenge the priority of universal rules and the perspective of impartiality. The question “why should I give priority to justice over my
relations with those I most care about?” can be a meaningful question not answerable by an appeal to the meaning of the terms in the languages of the dominant moralities. As Annette Baier has expressed this thought, in noting the resistance of many women to Kantian morality, “[w]here Kant concludes ‘so much the worse for women,’ we can conclude ‘so much the worse for the male fixation on the special skill of drafting legislation, for the bureaucratic mentality of rule worship, and for the male exaggeration of the importance of independence over mutual interdependence’” (Baier 1994, 26).

This is not to say that care excludes justice. Justice should be incorporated into morally acceptable practices of care. Parents of two or more children, for instance, ought to treat each fairly; the care given to a frail old person should respect her autonomy when possible. Within caring relations of a personal kind, competition may sometimes arise as when siblings engage in a competitive game, and fairness should prevail. At the social level, institutions that provide care ought to assure that the rights of recipients are respected and paternalism avoided. But in contexts of care, care should have priority, and justice be developed within caring relations.

At the level of society, justice now has overwhelming priority, as care is marginalized to private provision or grudging and stingy public support. From the perspective of the ethics of care, this is highly unsatisfactory. Care should at least be on a par with justice, and should perhaps have priority even in the social order, as it certainly has priority in the contexts of family and friends. Consider the case for the priority of care. Care is probably the most fundamental value of all. There can be care without justice: There has been little justice in traditional families but care has been provided. There can be no justice without care, for neither persons nor societies could exist without the enormous amount of care, with its associated values, involved in raising and educating children.

It is plausible to see caring relations as the wider and deeper context within which we seek justice and, in certain domains, give it priority.3 In the domain of law, for instance, the language and principles of justice ought to have priority, even though any “justice system” can and ought to be more caring than it almost surely is at present. At the same time, we should not lose sight of how the domain of law, with justice its priority, should be a limited domain and not imagined to be the model for the whole of moral life.

The values of care are already roughly incorporated into existing practices of care; they need to be better reflected and the practices improved and expanded. With better and more extensive practices of care, the needs for law and the enforcement mechanisms of the state could shrink. With better care in childhood and adolescence, fewer persons would turn to crime. But also, a care perspective would recommend a liberation of culture from the

3 For a pluralistic view in which different values are seen as appropriately having priority in different domains, see Held 1989.
domination of commercial interests, and greatly enlarged opportunities for
social decisions to be arrived at through dialogue and discourse rather than
through imposed governmental determination (Held 1993, chap. 5). Envi-
ronmental concerns would be accorded the importance they deserve. As the
culture disapproved of those failing to take responsibility for the effects of
their activities and for their failures to sustain caring relations, less enforce-
ment would be required.

From the perspective of care, markets should be limited rather than ever
more pervasive, as they undermine the caring relations in which persons
and the relations between them are valued for their own sakes (Held 2002a,
19–33). To the market, everything is a fungible commodity, and economic
gain is the highest priority (Radin 1996). In the United States, more and more
activities that were previously not in the market, such as child care and
health care, and varieties of public services that are being “privatized,” are
being pushed into the market. Even persons and their labor are increasingly
seen as commodities, as, for instance, labor markets become more often spot
markets, and replace relations between employers and employees that once
had at least some elements of caring (Kuttner 1998).

We can see how rights presuppose care. Respecting rights within a society
requires that persons care enough about each other to be willing to think of
each other as fellow members of whatever group or political entity is assert-
ing or recognizing such rights (Held 2000). In recent years, more and more
attention has been paid to the practices of civil society on which satisfactory
political institutions depend. Such practices build connections between
persons and ties that hold people together into a group capable of demo-
cratic self-government. They often foster caring relations. Various advocates
of the ethics of care explicitly include citizenship among the practices of care.
Peta Bowden, for instance, examines four types of caring practice: mother-
ing, friendship, nursing, and citizenship. Those who do not yet think of cit-
izenship in terms of care can come to see why they should. Bowden resists
undue generalizations and abstract theorizing about care, but notes resem-
brances among its various forms. These include their emphases on the inter-
dependence of persons and the quality of their relationships. All caring
practices have been devalued; all should be accorded recognition of their
enormous ethical significance.

4. Global Implications of the Ethics of Care

There is wide agreement among advocates of the ethics of care that it is not
to be limited to the “private” spheres of family and friendship, and that it
is a political as well as personal ethic. It clearly implies that society must
recognize its responsibilities to its children and others who are dependent,
enabling the best possible bringing up and educating of its future genera-
tions, appropriate responses to its members in need of health care, and assis-
tance with the care of dependents. Relying largely or entirely, as societies have traditionally done, on the unpaid labor of women in the household for the provision of care is inconsistent with the values of care as well as of justice. The ethics of care calls for increased state support of various forms of caring, and for meeting people’s needs in caring ways. It recommends the equal participation of men in caring activities and of women in the political and economic structures that affect the circumstances in which caring takes place. It guides the practices that encourage cooperation between persons and groups, and the caring that is needed to uphold the values of citizenship.

The ethics of care calls for the transformation of the different segments of society, with caring values and cooperation replacing the hierarchies and dominations of gender, class, race, and ethnicity. It recommends families characterized by mutual care; child care, education, and health care institutions well supported and developed; economies focused on actually meeting needs rather than enriching the powerful; military-industrial power under social constraints and decided about by women as well as men in the military services, defense industries, and diplomatic and political institutions; legal and political systems more expressive of the values of care as well as justice; and cultures free to present imaginative alternatives and to inspire cooperative and creative solutions to contested issues. But in addition to transforming each of such given domains, the ethics of care would transform the relations between domains (Held 1993). Instead of domination by military and economic and political power and the marginalization of caring activities, the latter would move to the center of attention, effort, and support. Bringing up new persons in caring relations that would be as admirable as possible would be seen as society’s most important goal.

We can also begin to see how the ethics of care should transform international politics, and relations between states as well as within them. Building on its feminist roots, the ethics of care notices rather than ignores the role of the cultural construct of masculinity in the behavior of states. There are many men whom this image of masculinity does not actually characterize, and it can be aspired to by women as well as by men. But it does shape what those in positions of power, including the voters who support them, aim to do. Among its influences are the overemphasis on the part of states on military security and economic pre-eminence, and the neglect of other aspects of security such as environmental and ecological concerns, the moral acceptability of policies to those affected, and the cultivating and maintaining of cooperative relations with others. The behavior of the United States in its near unilateral war against Iraq, its bullying of potential allies, its rejection of UN restraints and of the Kyoto and other treaties, illustrates the kind of foreign policies that almost certainly bear the influence of an exaggerated image of masculinity. The fear of being less than “tough,” the prejudice that cooperation is for sissies, infects the possibilities for improving relations between states.
Feminists have demonstrated the gender bias in Hobbes’ view of the political world (Di Stefano 1991). Realists and neorealists in international relations have transferred this Hobbesian view to the international arena, advocating preparation for war and the avoidance of dependence on others as the road to security. For Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, for instance, maximizing military power and maintaining effective autonomy lead to states’ success (Tickner 1992, 32). The ethics of care, in contrast, understands the importance of cultivating relations of trust, listening to the concerns of others, fostering international cooperation, and valuing interdependence.

In the usual construal of the global context, states are thought of as regions of security and order while the world beyond is seen as dangerous, anarchic, and frequently violent—Hobbes’ war of all against all. This picture is analogous to that of the household as “haven in a heartless world.” And military might is seen as analogous to the male “protector” of hearth and home. Feminists have cracked this picture of the household, making visible the enormous amount of family violence that occurs within it. They have noted the special ways in which women throughout the world are threatened: Women are subject to rape, forced marriage, female infanticide, and the denial of health care and nutrition, merely because they are female (Charlesworth 1994). And feminists are cracking the picture of military strength, and the willingness to use it, as offering protection. They note, for instance, that “civilians now account for about 90 percent of war casualties, the majority of whom are women and children” (Tickner 2001, 6). From the perspective of the ethic of care, the militarized state may be more threat than protector. When in possession of overwhelming force, the temptation may be overwhelming to use it; the result may be arms races among all who feel threatened, and ever less attention to the real sources of security.

Feminists have also examined the image of the “citizen-warrior” at the heart of so much political theory and international relations thinking (Tickner 1992, chap. 2). They make explicit its devaluation of women and women’s activities, and call for the revision of this constructed social ideal and of the way it has been transferred to the international arena of imagined personified states.

When the needs for law and restraint are acknowledged in relations between states, the model is then usually contractual, as within states, with the gender bias of law within states magnified on the international stage. However, as relations between states are re-examined, it is apparent how far they are from the assumptions of those who imagine their liberal democracies to be based on freely chosen contracts between equal individuals, and see this as the model for the world. In fact, states have been created and their

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4 The equality imagined has been not only moral but empirical—Hobbes’ equal vulnerability to the sword of one’s neighbor, for instance. When, on the world stage, states are imagined to be individuals, the removal from reality increases.
boundaries determined largely by force, and fraud has usually played a large role. Disparities between the global North and the global South are fraught with involuntary aspects and unequal power. Net capital flows during the 1980’s and 1990’s have been from South to North, and the gaps between poor and rich are growing alarmingly, with women increasingly the most vulnerable (Tickner 2001).

Alongside a gendered international law, the recommendations and requirements of economic development have also not been gender neutral. The effects of “restructuring” for the global market, for instance, have often been especially harmful to women as well as to other marginalized groups. During the 1990’s, feminist scholars began to show how “women have been, not the beneficiaries, but significant victims” of globalization “not only in the South but also in the North [. . .]” (Sisson Runyon 1999, 215–6). A paper from this period was called, appropriately, “Wealth of Nations–Poverty of Women” (WIDE 1995).

For women in Central and Eastern Europe, for instance, globalization brought unprecedented unemployment rates and the loss of state-funded maternity healthcare, maternity leave, and childcare. Women became “unattractive employees” to privatized industries that wanted to avoid providing benefits (Sisson Runyon 1999, 216). Restructuring has led to an intensification of pro-patriarchal family policies generally, pushing women out of the jobs they previously held and often into the sex trade (Uçarer 1999). The globalization so aggressively promoted by those with a neoliberal agenda has often been deleterious to many, but it has had an especially unfortunate impact on many women (Halliday 1991, 161).

Mainstream international relations theory, meanwhile, has paid inadequate attention to such global economic realities, or to the gross inadequacy of the way mainstream economics views social reality.

5. The Future of Care

Fiona Robinson argues that both mainstream international relations theory and mainstream normative theory about international relations have “resulted in the creation of a global ‘culture of neglect’ through a systematic devaluing of notions of interdependence, relatedness, and positive involvement in the lives of distant others” (Robinson 1999, 7). A morality suited to unchosen relations between agents of unequal vulnerability, as is the ethics of care, might often have more relevance to global realities than have versions of social contract theory.

In addition, the ethics of care, with its attention to actual differences between persons and groups and its resistance to universalizing all into an abstraction of the ahistorical rational-individual-as-such, may be more suited to the realities of global differences of culture, felt identity, resources, and group exclusion, the sources of much recent conflict.
Within the ethics of justice, respect for human rights has played a central role, and this concern has been increasingly apparent at the global level. But as feminist scholars have shown, the human rights of women have been woefully neglected. Until recently, violence against women was not part of the international human rights agenda. The public/private distinction was reproduced at the international level, with the many forms of violence against women—from rape to patterned malnutrition to bride-burning—considered “unfortunate cultural practices outside of the state’s or international system’s responsibilities” (Meyer 1999, 60).

In this and other ways it can be seen how international law has been deeply gendered. Issues traditionally of concern to men have been seen as general human concerns, while “women’s concerns” have been relegated to a special category, and marginalized. Strong efforts are now being made to recognize and to protect the human rights of women. But in addition, feminist moral theorists have been showing how the ethics of justice, itself, is gendered, and they have been developing the ethics of care.

As the ethics of care requires not only transformations of given domains—the legal, the economic, the political, the cultural, etc.—within a society, but also a transformation of the relations between such domains, so would it in the global context. Taking responsibility for global environmental well-being would become among the central concerns of a caring global policy. Fostering the kinds of economic development that actually would meet human needs and enable the care needed by all to be provided would also be seen as of primary importance. Ecofeminists, for instance, offer an ethic of care for nature and call for a radically different kind of economic progress. They ask that development be sustainable, ecologically sound, non-patriarchal, non-exploitative, and community oriented (Mies and Shiva 1993).

As caring values would become more influential within a society, resolutions of conflict through the threat and use of force would decrease; so would they on the international level as relations between states would be influenced by the ethics of care. This would not mean that at this stage of development there should be less rather than more support for whatever restraints can be provided by international law. Where the unrestrained use of force and violence is the norm, accepting legal restraints is more expressive of care than disregarding them. Some enforcement of law may always be needed between states as within them, though international police actions should be carried out by international bodies, not unilaterally by superpowers. But where caring relations have been adequately developed within a society, the need for legal enforcement can be reduced. The same could be looked forward to in the global context.

At the current stage of development, efforts to achieve progress in respect for human rights are also certainly to be supported rather than neglected. But in a world in which the multiple ties of care would have expanded to encompass the whole human family, and poverty and exclusion really
would be on the wane rather than, as at present, increasing, caring relations might make appeals to human rights less important.

A vast number of efforts, through non-governmental organizations, and state and international agencies, could do much to establish the ties of care between actual persons within and across state boundaries that can enable the decrease of violence and exploitation. Ties among poor women within a state, for instance, have potential for transforming economic and gender hierarchies. Ties between persons from different states can contribute to decreasing international hostility and resort to violence. They should be far more adequately supported. Those from the global North need to listen and understand, as in friendship, rather than bestow limited benevolence. And those in the global South need to overcome humiliation and participate in the discourses that will determine their circumstances, enabling caring economic development rather than unfettered capitalism.

It is caring relations rather than what persons do as individuals that exemplify the values of caring. The small societies of family and friendship are formed by caring relations. More attenuated but still evident caring relations between more distant people enable them to trust each other enough to form political entities and to accept each other as fellow citizens of states. A globalization of caring relations would help to enable people of different states and cultures to live in peace, to respect each other’s rights, to care together for their environments, and to improve their lives so that all their children might have hopeful futures.

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